The Resource Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont

Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont

Label
Incentives and political economy
Title
Incentives and political economy
Statement of responsibility
Jean-Jacques Laffont
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Annotation Mainstream economics has only recently recognized the need to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. "Incentives and Political Economy" uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments. It is written by one of Europe's leading theorists. The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed. The second part of the book recognizes the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves a lot of discretion to the politicians selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economicpolicies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitution weighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas. The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important
Member of
Cataloging source
N$T
Dewey number
338.9
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
HD87
LC item number
.L34 2000eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Clarendon lectures in economics
Label
Incentives and political economy, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 231-242) and index
http://library.link/vocab/branchCode
  • net
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 4.
  • Checks and Balances
  • II.
  • Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design.
  • 5.
  • Political Economy and Industrial Policy.
  • 6.
  • Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy.
  • 7.
  • Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation
  • 1.
  • III.
  • Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design.
  • 8.
  • Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation.
  • 9.
  • Collusion and Decentralization.
  • 10.
  • Concluding Remarks.
  • App.: Translations of Passages Quoted in French
  • Introduction
  • I.
  • Politicians as Informed Supervisors.
  • 2.
  • The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design.
  • 3.
  • An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers.
Control code
ocn310754321
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xii, 257 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780191596575
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
http://library.link/vocab/recordID
.b20721559
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)310754321
  • oso0191522228

Library Locations

    • Deakin University Library - Geelong Waurn Ponds CampusBorrow it
      75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, Victoria, 3216, AU
      -38.195656 144.304955
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