The Resource International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency, Andrew Feltenstein and Roger Lagunoff

International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency, Andrew Feltenstein and Roger Lagunoff

Label
International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency
Title
International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency
Statement of responsibility
Andrew Feltenstein and Roger Lagunoff
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This paper examines alternative ways to prevent losses from bank insolvencies. It is widely viewed that transparency in reporting bank balance sheets is a key element in reducing such losses. It is, however, unclear just how such transparency would be achieved. Current approaches to avoiding insolvencies generally involve international enforcement mechanisms. Among these are the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), and, more generally, an international bankruptcy court. We develop a model that compares two alternative institutions for bank auditing. Neither of these institutions would require as much enforcement capability as an international bankruptcy court, hence they would be easier to introduce. The first of these is a system of central bank auditing of national banks. The second type of auditing is carried out by an international agency that collects risk information on banks in all countries and then provides it to depositors. Using a game-theoretic approach, we compare the informativeness of the disclosure rule in the symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in each of the two different auditing institutions. We show that the international auditor generally performs at least as well, and sometimes better than, auditing by either central banks, which, in turn, perform better than voluntary disclosure by the banks themselves. The results do not assume any informational advantages of the international auditor, nor is the international auditor somehow less "corrupt" than the central banks. Rather, the international auditor's credibility comes from the simple fact that its incentives are not distorted by a sovereignty bias that plagues the central banks
Member of
Action
digitized
Cataloging source
OCLCE
Dewey number
332.1
Index
no index present
LC call number
HG3881.5.I58
LC item number
W67 no.03/190
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
IMF working paper
Series volume
WP/03/190
Label
International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency, Andrew Feltenstein and Roger Lagunoff
Publication
Antecedent source
file reproduced from original
http://library.link/vocab/branchCode
  • net
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
black and white
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Control code
ocn647645065
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (29 pages)
File format
one file format
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781451905045
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
http://library.link/vocab/recordID
.b37169026
Reproduction note
Electronic reproduction.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)647645065
  • imf1282050761
System details
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.

Library Locations

    • Deakin University Library - Geelong Waurn Ponds CampusBorrow it
      75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, Victoria, 3216, AU
      -38.195656 144.304955
Processing Feedback ...