The Resource Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt, Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines

Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt, Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines

Label
Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt
Title
Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt
Statement of responsibility
Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Annotation.
Related
Member of
Additional physical form
Online (ebrary)
Cataloging source
CaPaEBR
Characteristic
document
Dewey number
336.39
LC call number
HJ7461
LC item number
.S744 2008eb
Series statement
IMF working paper
Series volume
WP/08/164
Summary expansion
We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative outcome under discretion. Second, we show that this familiar result breaks down when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. with government debt, the Nash equilibrium still entails too much public spending but leads to lower interest rates than the cooperative policy, because debt has to be adjusted back to its pre-shock level to ensure time consistency. a setup of fiscal leadership does not avoid this socially costly outcome. Imposing a debt penalty onto the myopic government under either Nash or fiscal leadership raises welfare substantially, while appointing a conservative central bank is less effective
Label
Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt, Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines
Publication
Copyright
Note
  • "July 2008."
  • At head of title: Fiscal Affairs Department
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
http://library.link/vocab/branchCode
  • net
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Control code
000053028224
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (40 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781451914757
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations (some color)
http://library.link/vocab/recordID
.b37208688
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)451167897
  • imf145191475X

Library Locations

    • Deakin University Library - Geelong Waurn Ponds CampusBorrow it
      75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, Victoria, 3216, AU
      -38.195656 144.304955
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