The Resource The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment, edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger

The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment, edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger

Label
The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment
Title
The natural resources trap
Title remainder
private investment without public commitment
Statement of responsibility
edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
"This book is important and timely, bringing together some of the world's leading economists. The theory chapters provide new insights and apply new developments in contract theory to the problems of natural resources and credible host country policies. The case studies provide up-to-date illustrations of the difficulties and development of host country policy in Latin America and the UK." Roderick Duncan, Charles Sturt University, Australia "This book is likely to become a standard reference in the area of natural resources and credible host country policies-coming, as it does, with a solid grounding in modern economic theory." Tim Worrall, University of Manchester Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sectoris called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this guestion in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. --Book Jacket
Cataloging source
N$T
Dewey number
333.7
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
HC85
LC item number
.N36 2010eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Label
The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment, edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
http://library.link/vocab/branchCode
  • net
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation: Ex Ante Price Caps and Ex Post Interventions
  • Dieter Helm
  • Commentary
  • Jeffrey Frankel
  • 10.
  • Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination: What Went Wrong in Bolivia?
  • Fernando H. Navajas
  • Commentary
  • Fernando Candia Castillo
  • 11.
  • 8.
  • Urgency and Betrayal: Three Attempts to Foster Private Investment in Argentina's Oil Industry
  • Nicolas Gadano
  • Commentary
  • Louis Wells
  • 12.
  • The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela
  • Francisco Monaldi
  • Commentary: Not Just a Distributional Matter
  • Ramon Espinasa
  • III.
  • Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts: A Real Options Approach
  • Conclusion
  • Anders B. Trolle
  • Commentary
  • Robert Pindyck
  • II.
  • Country Cases
  • 9.
  • Lucia Quesada
  • Commentary
  • Lawrence H. Summers
  • 3.
  • Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and Expropriation
  • Mark L.J. Wright
  • Commentary: Expropriations, Defaults, and Financial Architecture
  • Jeromin Zettelmeyer
  • 4.
  • A Resource Belief Curse? Oil and Individualism
  • Machine generated contents note:
  • Robert MacCulloch
  • Commentary
  • George-Marios Angeletos
  • 5.
  • Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation
  • Ronald Fischer
  • 6.
  • Denying the Temptation to GRAB
  • Richard Zeckhauser
  • 7.
  • 1.
  • Dealing with Expropriations: General Guidelines for Oil Production Contracts
  • Roberto Rigobon
  • Commentary
  • Erich Muehlegger
  • Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources
  • Laurence Tai
  • I.
  • Theoretical Papers
  • 2.
  • Petroleum Contracts: What Does Contract Theory Tell Us?
Control code
ocn648759758
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 519 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780262275538
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other control number
9786612736995
Other physical details
illustrations
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
273699
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
http://library.link/vocab/recordID
.b25615312
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (OCoLC)648759758
  • pebcs0262013797

Library Locations

    • Deakin University Library - Geelong Waurn Ponds CampusBorrow it
      75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, Victoria, 3216, AU
      -38.195656 144.304955
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