The Resource The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge, Karl Popper ; edited by Troels Eggers Hansen ; translated by Andreas Pickel
The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge, Karl Popper ; edited by Troels Eggers Hansen ; translated by Andreas Pickel
 Language

 eng
 ger
 eng
 Extent
 xl, 510 p.
 Contents

 A brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance
 Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth Exposition [1933]
 Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis)
 Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge
 Formulation of the Problem
 The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
 Deductivtsm and Inductivism
 Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions
 Rationalism and empiricismdeductivism and inductivism
 The possibility of a deductivist psychology of knowledge
 The Problem of Induction
 The infinite regression (Hume's argument) The inductivist positions
 The NormalStatement Positions
 The normalstatement positions: naive inductivism, strict positivism and apriorism
 Critique of strict positivism  twofold transcendence of natural laws
 The transcendental method  presentation of apriorism
 Critique of apriorism
 Kant and Fries
 Supplement to the critique of apriorism. (Psychologism and transcendentalism in Kant and Fries.On the question of the empirical basis.)
 Probability Positions
 The probability positions  subjective belief in probability
 Statements about the objective probability of events
 Probability as an objective degree of validity of universal empirical statements
 One way of more closely defining the concept of the probability of a hypothesis (primary and secondary probability of hypotheses). The concept of simplicity
 The concept of the corroboration of a hypothesis  positivist, pragmatist and probabilistic interpretations of the concept of corroboration
 The infinite regression of probability statements
 PseudoStatement Positions
 The pseudostatement positions: new formulation of the problem
 Natural laws as "instructions for the formation of statements"
 "True  false" or "useful  useless"? Consistent pragmatism Difficulties of consistent pragmatism
 Tool and schema as purely pragmatic constructs
 Natural laws as propositional functions
 Conventionalism
 The pseudostatement positions will temporarily be put away: conventionalism
 The three interpretations of axiomatic systems. (The circle of problems surrounding conventionalism)
 Conventionalist implicit and explicit definitions Propositional function and propositional equation
 Conventionalist propositional equations as tautological general implications
 Can axiomaticdeductive systems also be understood as consequence classes of pure propositional functions (of pseudostatements)?
 The coordinative definitions of empiricism: synthetic general implications
 Conventionalist and empiricist interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry
 Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements
 Implication and general implication
 General implication and the distinction between strictly universal and singular statements
 Universal concept and individual conceptclass and element
 Strictly universal statementsthe problem of induction and the problem of universals
 Comments on the problem of universals
 Back to the PseudoStatement Positions
 Return to the discussion of the pseudostatement positions
 Symmetry or asymmetry in the evaluation of natural laws?
 The negative evaluation of universal statements. Critique of the strictly symmetrical interpretation of pseudostatements
 An infinite regression of pseudostatements
 An apriorist pseudostatement position
 Interpretation of the critique up to this point; comments on the unity of theory and practice
 A last chance for the pseudostatement positions
 PseudoStatement Positions and the Concept of Meaning
 The concept of meaning and logical positivism
 The concept of meaning and the demarcation problemthe fundamental thesis of inductivism
 Critique of the inductivist dogma of meaning
 Fully decidable and partially decidable empirical statementsthe antinomy of the knowability of the world. (Conclusion of the critique of the pseudostatement positions.)
 The dialectical and the transcendental corroboration of the solution
 Is the problem of induction solved?
 Isbn
 9780415394314
 Label
 The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge
 Title
 The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge
 Statement of responsibility
 Karl Popper ; edited by Troels Eggers Hansen ; translated by Andreas Pickel
 Language

 eng
 ger
 eng
 Cataloging source
 DLC
 Dewey number
 121
 Illustrations
 illustrations
 Index
 index present
 Language note
 Translated from the German
 LC call number
 BD163
 LC item number
 .P6413 2008
 Literary form
 non fiction
 Label
 The two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge, Karl Popper ; edited by Troels Eggers Hansen ; translated by Andreas Pickel
 Bibliography note
 Includes bibliographical references and index
 http://library.link/vocab/branchCode

 zbnus
 mel
 Contents
 A brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance  Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth Exposition [1933]  Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis)  Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge  Formulation of the Problem  The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation  Deductivtsm and Inductivism  Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions  Rationalism and empiricismdeductivism and inductivism  The possibility of a deductivist psychology of knowledge  The Problem of Induction  The infinite regression (Hume's argument) The inductivist positions  The NormalStatement Positions  The normalstatement positions: naive inductivism, strict positivism and apriorism  Critique of strict positivism  twofold transcendence of natural laws  The transcendental method  presentation of apriorism  Critique of apriorism  Kant and Fries  Supplement to the critique of apriorism. (Psychologism and transcendentalism in Kant and Fries.On the question of the empirical basis.)  Probability Positions  The probability positions  subjective belief in probability  Statements about the objective probability of events  Probability as an objective degree of validity of universal empirical statements  One way of more closely defining the concept of the probability of a hypothesis (primary and secondary probability of hypotheses). The concept of simplicity  The concept of the corroboration of a hypothesis  positivist, pragmatist and probabilistic interpretations of the concept of corroboration  The infinite regression of probability statements  PseudoStatement Positions  The pseudostatement positions: new formulation of the problem  Natural laws as "instructions for the formation of statements"  "True  false" or "useful  useless"? Consistent pragmatism Difficulties of consistent pragmatism  Tool and schema as purely pragmatic constructs  Natural laws as propositional functions  Conventionalism  The pseudostatement positions will temporarily be put away: conventionalism  The three interpretations of axiomatic systems. (The circle of problems surrounding conventionalism)  Conventionalist implicit and explicit definitions Propositional function and propositional equation  Conventionalist propositional equations as tautological general implications  Can axiomaticdeductive systems also be understood as consequence classes of pure propositional functions (of pseudostatements)?  The coordinative definitions of empiricism: synthetic general implications  Conventionalist and empiricist interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry  Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements  Implication and general implication  General implication and the distinction between strictly universal and singular statements  Universal concept and individual conceptclass and element  Strictly universal statementsthe problem of induction and the problem of universals  Comments on the problem of universals  Back to the PseudoStatement Positions  Return to the discussion of the pseudostatement positions  Symmetry or asymmetry in the evaluation of natural laws?  The negative evaluation of universal statements. Critique of the strictly symmetrical interpretation of pseudostatements  An infinite regression of pseudostatements  An apriorist pseudostatement position  Interpretation of the critique up to this point; comments on the unity of theory and practice  A last chance for the pseudostatement positions  PseudoStatement Positions and the Concept of Meaning  The concept of meaning and logical positivism  The concept of meaning and the demarcation problemthe fundamental thesis of inductivism  Critique of the inductivist dogma of meaning  Fully decidable and partially decidable empirical statementsthe antinomy of the knowability of the world. (Conclusion of the critique of the pseudostatement positions.)  The dialectical and the transcendental corroboration of the solution  Is the problem of induction solved?
 Control code
 000042791990
 Dimensions
 24 cm
 Extent
 xl, 510 p.
 Isbn
 9780415394314
 Lccn
 2008007767
 Other physical details
 ill.
 http://library.link/vocab/recordID
 .b24802359
 System control number

 kg24802359
 (OCoLC)212627154
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